The Indian Scientists Against Nuclear Weapons (ISANW) was formed immediately after Pokhran II nuclear tests conducted by India in May 1998, as a spontaneous reaction to the changed nuclear scenario in the country. It aims to be a united informed body of scientists to work against the proliferation of nuclear armaments in the country.

1. Proceedings of the Meeting "India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine"

The following is the gist of their addresses. The scribes (Madhuri Katti and Vishwambhar Pati) have compiled it on the basis of hand-written notes taken during the meeting, and assume full responsibility for errors of omission. The intention has been to be as faithful to the spirit of the discussion as possible, and inaccuracies or inadvertent misrepresentations may please be brought to our notice as soon as possible.

Please note that Dr. Amulya Reddy's address is being separately put up in its entirety on the ISANW website.

Dr. RODDAM NARASIMHA

Dr. Narasimha prefaced his address with his opposition to nuclear weapons in general. Therefore he was happy to be at a meeting organised by ISANW, for he considered himself to be a scientist against nuclear weapons. Indeed, he had enlisted many years ago with Pugwash, but his frustration with that body was exceeded only by his frustration with western policies on nuclear weapons.

In his view, there are two main features of the doctrine:

1. It is the first instance of a country putting forth such a doctrine before weaponisation. All other nuclear weapons states have enunciated their nuclear doctrines (if at all) after the fact.

2. The National Advisory Board (of which Dr. Narasimha was a member) that drafted the Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) consisted of 27 members from diverse walks of life, and thus represented a remarkable across-the-board consensus in the drafting process.

The core elements of the doctrine were presented by Dr. Narasimha in a set of transparencies. He drew particular attention to the following:

Art. 1.3 India's decision to become a nuclear weapons state gave it a greater degree of autonomy on the world stage with respect to decision-making in its developmental process.

Art. 2.1 The Global World Order talks of global deterrence. It is funny that the original nuclear weapons states (N5 states) argue for disarmament on the one hand and weaponise on the other.

Art. 2.3 India's nuclear deterrent has to be a "minimum nuclear deterrent". It is to be used only in retaliation to a nuclear attack, and is not to be a "first use" weapon. Such a theory of nuclear deterrence has worked well all over the world in the last 50 years. The deterrent is to be based on the Triad Delivery System (comprising missile/aircraft/seaborne warheads), with final authorisation for use resting with the Prime Minister.

Art. 8.1 India's efforts towards a nuclear-free world have been futile. In all, India has made 14 such attempts in the last 50 years in international forums such as the United Nations. (A transparency listing the chronology of these efforts since 1948 was presented). Key proposals were, for example, the Nehru Administrations efforts in the period 1954-59, and the Rajiv Gandhi-Mikhail Gorbachev Declaration in 1986. In 1990, India proposed a draft Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which would be linked to time-bound disarmament by the N5 states. The last straw which caused India to abandon all these efforts was the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by the N5 states.

The net result is that the original N5 states are in no mood to abolish their nuclear arsenals. The global tally of nuclear warheads has gone from 38,000 in 1968 to about 70,000 in the mid-80's, to the current figure of about 36,000. The START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) target of 20,000 by the year 2007 seems to have run aground, and no movement in this direction is apparent.

He then cited several instances from the last five decades to establish that nuclear deterrence works as a doctrine. In this period, inspite of 42 instances of the threat of nuclear force ("nuclear bullying"), nuclear weapons have never actually been used. On the other hand, as ex-U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig remarked: "Fission and fusion explosives were used daily in U.S. policy". In other words, nuclear weapons are devices of diplomacy.

Western perceptions of India were negative, and we needed to alter these perceptions. The general Western belief is that India will never get its act together. For example, an article in "The Economist" recently opined that India is unlikely to achieve "Great Power" status by A.D. 2030.

The DND is to be regarded as a guideline, and not a time-table. Regarding affordability of nuclear weaponisation, he cited some facts and figures. In India's strategic budget allocation of $ 1 billion (inclusive of expenditure on DAE, DRDO and ISRO), the nuclear weaponisation component is only about $150 million. Furthermore, India's defence expenditure has declined from 3.37 % of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in 1988 to about 2.45 % in 1997. The corresponding figures for Pakistan are 7.47 % and 5.13 % respectively. (In his transparency, Dr. Narasimha quoted only percentages, and not the actual dollar figures. The dollar was taken to be at its current value.)

As regards India's commitment to the principle of non-violence, he quoted from Mahatma Gandhi, who approved of Indian troops in Kashmir thus: "If the choice is between violence and cowardice, I advise violence".

In conclusion, India's next immediate strategic steps should be:

1. To challenge the 6 nuclear weapons states to produce draft nuclear doctrines in their respective countries.

2. To take the lead in promoting de-alerted warheads and missiles.

3. To promote global nuclear disarmament and cooperation with the 6 nuclear weapons states, and wean influential countries towards global nuclear disarmament.

4. To promote global democracy by strengthening international institutions.

5. To pursue our strategic goals on our own if the 6 nuclear weapons states make no convincing moves towards global nuclear disarmament.

6. To complete our half-hearted attempts at state-making.

Opened his address by remarking that it is not necessary to dissect the DND line by line to understand and analyse the damaging effect it will have on India's strategic interests. It should be understood in the context, and the atmosphere in which it appears. Looking at India's past record in the direction of nuclear disarmament, there are two main legs on which our efforts thus far have stood. They are:

1. India will not nuclear-weaponise, for India does not believe that nuclear deterrence enhances security, and categorically rejects it as a concept.

2. India gives no guarantees to the N5 states about surrendering its autonomy, again by consistently rejecting the NPT and the CTBT. It holds that the goal of the existing NPT is not nuclear non-proliferation, but the preservation of the nuclear status-quo dividing the world into nuclear haves and have-nots. The CTBT is also rejected on similar grounds, and India's nuclear technological capability is thus safeguarded.

Pokhran II (and the subsequent DND) is a distinct break from the above policy. It now welcomes deterrence on the pretext of giving up nuclear "naivete", and thus also abandons the earlier principled positions against the NPT and CTBT. It has supplanted the earlier position with "nuclear ambiguity". Global disarmament was a policy that had been hitherto adequately represented by the Indian Government. In this regard we have gone backwards, because this situation no longer obtains.

In the aftermath of the Pokhran II tests, is it really likely that India will be able to develop a "triad delivery system" ? More details of such a system, as also the precise nature of our capability, are needed than are evident from the doctrine. For example, if we do decide to develop an ICBM capability, we can bomb New York. If, on the other hand, we only go in for IRBM's or less, we can only reach Beijing or Diego Garcia. So these questions have sharp foreign policy implications. Our DND does not stand on the reality of Pokhran II, and appears only to be a "wish list". As far as the technological basis of Pokhran II goes, it has been noted by Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam that 70 % of India's techno-defence needs are from foreign sources.

There has also been a dichotomy of discourse on the topic. Proponents of the DND offer varying explanations:

(a) Pakistan is really responsible for our seeking nuclear-weapons capability.

(b) It is an act of protest against the N5.

For example, one of the principal architects of the doctrine, K. Subrahmanyam, only lists strategic developments vis-a-vis Pakistan. Jasjit Singh talks of the threat from China. No overall security review has preceded Pokhran II. Thus the question naturally arises as to whom or what our nuclear weapons are for? This question is unanswered in the DND, which seems to imply that we will "take on everybody". However, we need to know with respect which country (or countries) our minimum credible deterrent will be envisaged, or have a chance of working. For example the U.S. has 20,000 nuclear warheads, and Pakistan probably about 10.

The DND provides no guidelines for a stand-off between India and Pakistan. In the context of the South-Asian reality, the DND will be destabilising and dangerous. For example, will it address the issue of Kashmir? Or will it promote more conventional wars? Kargil should be viewed in this light.

The recommendation of the DND that a high level of conventional power be coupled with a triad nuclear defence system clearly implies that we are preparing for more conventional confrontations as well.

Finally, the theory of nuclear deterrence has been rejected by a large number of influential people, including those who earlier espoused it and were instrumental in propounding it (e.g. General Lee Butler and Robert McNamara). The reason for this is that deterrence theory does not work on Game Theory. It works only on the psychological and political plane. There was also certainly no precedent for a South-Asian nuclear deterrent.

Ironically, our Government has informed the U.S. Govt., even before it informed Indian citizens, that we will not be contemplating submarine based nuclear missiles, and that our nuclear weapons were not intended for use against any of the western nuclear powers, only for countering China and Pakistan.

What the DND has really succeeded in doing is "upping the ante" for future governments in India, who will not dare roll back the basic benchmark that this DND provides. The argument that India was a "soft state" prior to nuclear weaponisation is fallacious. Much before Pokhran II, India was successful in dismembering Pakistan, handling the Sri Lankan insurgency, quashing militancy in Punjab and the North-east, and annexing Sikkim.

The reason for Indian insecurity, according to Shekhar Gupta (writing in the Indian Express) is a "failure of nerve" on the part of the Indian establishment, not that India is a soft state. This failure of nerve has resulted from our dismal failure on the developmental front, and has manifested itself in our handling of everything from the WTO to the CTBT.

ADDENDUM: During the question-and-answer session, Dr. Jayaraman emphasized the difference between Pokhran I and Pokhran II:

1. The difference between Pokhran I and Pokhran II was the fact that on the latter occasion, the device was tested in a "weapons configuration". Without testing a device in a "weapons configuration", it cannot be described as a nuclear weapon ("proven munition" in jargon).

2. The CAG report pointed critically to the DAE's Beryllium Facility. This facility has been stockpiling beryllium, something which is used only for nuclear weapons. Proof-tested nuclear weapons did not exist before 1998.

Dr. Rajagopal prefaced his address with a rhetorical question: Can we trust the nuclear weapons states ? In the interregnum between Pokhran I and Pokhran II, the NPT and CTBT were debated and negotiated time after time, with the objective of providing a benchmark for disarmament. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) drew up a new proposal for a nuclear agreement. The key features were a ban on nuclear testing in very broad terms. The N5 states were unwilling to consider the NAM proposals. Nevertheless, Article 6 of the NPT evolved out of this NAM proposal.

This article essentially calls upon the parties concerned to negotiate in good faith, and for a cessation of the nuclear arms race. It calls for a treaty on nuclear disarmament at an early date, with a treaty on general principles. However, the N5 states have consistently resisted making any clear commitments in this regard. There were reviews in 1975 and 1990, and the 1990 review conference decided to indefinitely extend the NPT, with the N5 states' decision to make a linkage with the CTBT to evade their disarmament commitments. Indeed, they made no progress in this regard. The upshot was that the non-nuclear weapons states (such as India) were expected to honour their commitments, whereas the N5 were not bound in any way to do so.

When the U.S. got worried that its version of "non-proliferation" was not working, it linked the NPT and CTBT. At this point, the U.S. has moved from third to fourth order development in its nuclear arsenal. It hasn't much to lose by signing the CTBT, because it does not need to do further nuclear testing to upgrade its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, it has already conducted nearly 1053 tests, and now all further refinements can be achieved in the laboratory.

Nothing in International Law can force a sovereign state to sign a treaty. At this point the NPT holdouts are India, Pakistan and Israel. The attempt was to force it down our throats by linking it with the CTBT. At any rate, it cannot go into force unless 44 states (including India) sign it. Now the U.S. has itself rejected it, and it is in limbo. U.S. commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation are suspect.

It is natural for India to think that the N5 want to legitimise their nuclear arsenals, while making it illegal for others to possess nuclear weapons. In the light of this, our earlier position of "nuclear ambiguity" is rather similar to a 55-year old man keeping his marriage-option open.

We had therefore exercised restraint since Pokhran I, because there is a trade-off between nuclear/military capability and economic blockades and sanctions. If we had gone ahead with a weaponisation program in 1974, we could not have survived the sanctions that would have inevitably resulted. In 1998, we did withstand such sanctions.

Moving to the DND, the doctrine is purposely vague about numbers and the meaning of a "minimum credible deterrent". This ambiguity should be viewed as a strategy, for it is not advisable to explicitly state target countries or numbers in such a doctrine.

The reality is that China has consistently failed to provide any assurances to the U.S. that it is not engaged in transferring technology acquired from the West to Pakistan. In fact, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has even stopped processing Chinese technological requests. For horizontal proliferation of nuclear technology, the award must certainly go to China. On the other hand, the U.S. has known all along that nuclear weapons have been lying in their packing crates in Pakistan, and also where these crates originated from.

As regards nuclear arms control, START-1 has made no real effort at disarmament. START-2 is stalled because the U.S. will not modify the ABM Treaty. Thus, the low state of credibility of the nuclear weapons states has forced a nuclear imperative upon us.

Dr. Reddy provided a hard copy of his address, and this is being separately put on the ISANW website.

Q. What is the correlation between nuclear weapons and security? In the instances of Vietnam and Afghanistan, two nuclear super-powers were defeated by primitive non-nuclear states. Is nuclear security a myth? (Dr. Amulya Reddy added to this question by remarking that of the 42 instances of nuclear bullying listed by Dr. Narasimha, the threats didn't work in several instances)

A. (Dr. Narasimha) Nuclear weapons were not used on, or used to threaten Vietnam because the USSR had nuclear weapons. Similarly, the Soviet nuclear threat in Afghanistan was counterbalanced by US nuclear weapons. India has never succeeded in getting nuclear protection from a nuclear state. No nuclear state was willing to provide a nuclear shield for India. In the aftermath of 1974, there was a loose understanding with the USSR. The collapse of that country and the end of the Cold War has changed this scenario. India's interests are best served if there are no nuclear weapons in the world at all. When India asked for China's support in its nuclear disarmament efforts, China quite simply told us that this did not concern us because we were not a nuclear-weapons state. Nuclear weapons do not guarantee anything, but the aggressive actions of various states in the past have been limited by the existence of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use.

Q. Prior to Pokhran II, India had overwhelming conventional military superiority over Pakistan. Isn't it a bad strategy to trade this superiority for nuclear parity?

A. (Dr. Narasimha) India doesn't want to destroy Pakistan. Pakistan already acquired nuclear weapons from China before Pokhran II. Now that both countries have nuclear weapons capability, it will prevent them from getting into a disastrous war.

Q. Did Pakistan have nuclear weapons prior to Pokhran I? If it didn't, then didn't Pokhran I trigger off the nuclear arms race in the subcontinent. Also don't the rash statements made by L.K.Advani and Brajesh Mishra during the Kargil war about using nuclear weapons on Pakistan bely the assertion that India does not seek the destruction of Pakistan?

A. (Dr. Narasimha and Dr. Rajagopal) There is evidence that Pakistan had started acquiring nuclear technology from China even prior to 1974. We are not aware of the statements you attribute to Advani and Mishra. (Addendum : Dr. R. Shankar of the Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai countered the first statement by questioning the nature of the precise evidence of Pakistani nuclear weapon acquisition or development prior to 1974. Dr. T. Jayaraman clarified that L.K. Advani had issued a veiled nuclear warning to Pakistan before Kargil, with the euphemism "altered security situation in the subcontinent").

Q: This question to Prof. Narasimha concerns the last point in the transparency i.e. the issue of the unfinished task of state building. The point is not clear as to how nuclear weaponisation helps in this process. What did it do to the Soviet Union? The same point can be said from the other side of the border, who complain that India helped in the process of dismemberment of their country and helped the process of formation of Bangladesh. They too advance this very issue of strong state to justify their actions, which like yours, also can include nuclear weaponisation. Apart from stating your positions on international issues, you did not mention what bearing these questions of a strong state and nuclear weapons have in our national life i.e. they are the points in the agenda of a political party which used these in their election manifesto and have organised marches to demolish historical monuments and even had plans to distribute radioactive sands from Pokhran II,- all in the name of a strong state, national prestige and creation of a vibrant India. You have talked of autonomy of the Indian state and the desired international prestige of India. To achieve such a prestige why was nuclear weapons chosen as the area of priority. Can the acquisition of a nuclear weapon wipe away the ignominy of our state when the government falls overboard to clear 1500 goods into the country in areas we do have production capacity in the country?

A. (Dr. Narasimha) I did not mention the unfinished task of state building particularly in the context of nuclear doctrine. This had to be taken as a package of several steps and there was no question that some of the economic issues had to have priority, one of them being that the expenditure of the government in the social sector did not reach the poor. As far as the affiliation of the members of the panel was concerned, one could not identify them with BJP. The committee had a mixed composition as far as the ideological positions were concerned. It has to be admitted that in India the only political groups which have steadfastly opposed the nuclear doctrine in an ideological plane were the communists.

Q. In the days of Nehru, India at least had clear policy objectives, both in the domestic and foreign spehres. Today, counterpoising ourselves against the U.S., we note that the U.S. has a very clear policy objective, that of global economic and political dominance. It seeks to do this by forging a global alliance which will protect its strategic military interests. In the old days, we had the support of the Soviet Union, but now that is no longer the case. So, what are India's long term policy objectives? Are we trying to set ourselves up as a local "paramount power"? Indeed, all our neighbours are complaining about this, not just Pakistan. What is the state-building you (Dr. Narasimha) referred to, and what are we aiming at?

A. (Dr. Narasimha) I don't have an answer. I do agree that the "total package" that existed in Nehru's time no longer exists. Today there is no such global overall world-view. Today there is a sizeable number of people who believe that the policy objectives of the Nehru era (especially the economic ones) are less and less valuable.

(Added comment from Dr. Reddy): India wants a multipolar world but a unipolar subcontinent.

Q. Isn't it evident that given the costs of nuclear weaponisation, economic and nuclear development are mutually contradictory?

Related Q. : Our economic policies seem to be moving us completely away from autonomy. How will nuclear weapons make us autonomous?

A. (Dr. Narasimha) The amount that is going to be spent on nuclear weaponisation is a very small percentage of our GNP. The real problem is that the rest of the money, which is to be spent on social and economic development, is not reaching the people. This is what has to be remedied.

Q. Dr. Narasimha used the phrase "nuclear bullying" when referring to the U.S. But the same argument is used to say that "deterrence" has prevented a nuclear war from taking place. Where is the fine line between "bullying" and "deterrence"? And is India trying for a deterrence strategy or a bullying strategy?

(Dr. Narasimha joined in the laughter, but there was no clear answer from any of the panellists.)

Indian Scientists Against Nuclear Weapons
isanw@arbornet.org.
http://www.isanw.org/