Indian Scientists Against Nuclear Weapons

NEWSLETTER

Issue 2

October 1999


The Indian Scientists Against Nuclear Weapons (ISANW) was formed immediately after Pokhran II nuclear tests conducted by India in May 1998, as a spontaneous reaction to the changed nuclear scenario in the country. It aims to be a united informed body of scientists to work against the proliferation of nuclear armaments in the country. This monthly newsletter intends to keep its members updated about the activities of the group, as well as to circulate important articles and news items relevant to our work.

CONTENTS

  1. Editorial
  2. Important Articles
    1. "A Recipe for Disaster" By M V Ramana
    2. "A Recipe for Unending Pak-India Nuclear Competition" by Parvez Hoodbhoy
  3. Pokhran II: A Year Later Convention against Nuclear Weapons, May 99, Chennai
  4. Letters to ISANW

1. Editorial

We received enthusiatic response to the inaugural issue of the ISANW Newsletter, both from members and sympathisers. While India's draft nuclear doctrine was being debated (see articles listed below), some more issues have cropped up after the military overthrow of the Nawaz Sharif government in Pakistan. An interesting event has also been the rejection of the CTBT by the American senate. We believe the ISANW Newsletter will continue to serve a useful purpose in debating new situations. This issue has been delayed - in future we will try to bring it out on time.

2. Important Articles

  1. "A Recipe for Disaster"
    By M V Ramana
    (at http://www.isanw.org/news/02/ramana.html )
  2. "A Recipe for Unending Pak-India Nuclear Competition"
    by Parvez Hoodbhoy
    (at http://www.isanw.org/news/02/parvez.html )

3. Pokhran II: A Year After

On 9th May 1999, ISANW organized a Convention Against Nuclear Weapons in Chennai. The following is the transcript of the talk Introduction and Overview delivered by R. Ramanujam in the meeting. Transcripts of some other talks are available on the online-version of the Newsletter.
  1. Introduction and Overview by R. Ramanujam
  2. An Engineer's View Point on Nuclear Weaponization by Timothy Gonsalves
  3. Peace by Peaceful Means by S. Chatterjee
  4. Abolition: Illusion and Reality by M. V. N. Murthy

Introduction and Overview

R. Ramanujam

It is almost a year since the peace movement in India received a jolt, not only by the nuclear explosions in Pokhran, but also by the expression of aggressive militarism on an unprecedented scale in the history of the subcontinent. The following quotation provides an apt opener for today's discussions:

In the tragic situation which confronts humanity, we feel that scientists should assemble in conference to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of weapons of mass destruction. We are speaking on this occasion, not as members of this or that nation or continent or creed, but as human beings, members of the species Man, whose continued existence is in doubt.

These are the words with which the famous Russell - Einstein declaration of 1955 begins. The dangers have not faded away, and the responsibility of scientists `to appraise the perils' has not lessened.

Anniversaries are occasions to take stock, to discuss unfinished business, and to plan ahead. A year after Pokhran II, the country finds itself committed to an expensive and dangerous path of nuclear weaponization, a strategic mess it will be difficult to extricate ourselves from. Today, our discussions will be an attempt to see how far down this road we have come, what options remain for us, and how we can rededicate ourselves meaningfully to the goal of nuclear disarmament.

In May 1998, after the Pokhran explosions, some people believed that we had `established supremacy' vis a vis Pakistan; the answer came loud and clear from Chugai Hills. Some were naive enough to argue that the tests were meant only to demonstrate Indian capability, not to build `real weapons'. The answer came in Parliament, with the Prime Minister asserting that Indian security would be built on the principle of ``minimum credible deterrence''.

Many questions bother Indian citizens deeply: In what way has the `Brahmaastra' enhanced our security ? Or, on the contrary, have nuclear weapons only increased the dangers for the Indian people ? Is the world taking us more `seriously' now ? Or, on the contrary, do global powers find it easier to apply a variety of pressures on us ?

There is another category of questions: what did Pokhran II demonstrate, really ? The Government has claimed that the conducted tests were sufficient to build safe deployable weapons. On what basis can this be believed apart from simple faith ? Can we be sure that nuclear weapons will be built, controlled precisely and deployed in strategic locations without compromising the safety of ordinary people who have little power or inclination to confront the Government ?

This line of discussion reveals many frustrations buried in the public mind. We show pride in spectacular successes in fields like nuclear energy and space vehicles. But these are (at least potentially) militaristic applications of science and technology. On the other hand, the problems of poverty and underdevelopment remain unsolved with all this scientific and technological might. Is the state policy of governmental support and funding working towards militarizing S&T endeavour ? How can we ensure that work on peaceful applications (like nuclear power, telecommunications etc) is in no way compromised ? Further, apart from such hidden costs, what are the actual costs of nuclear weaponization, with all the paraphernalia of command and control structure and delivery systems that go with it ? Can we afford this expenditure, is it consistent with democratically determined priorities of national development ?

Pokhran II has also thrown up the serious problem of public trust breaking down. We are told that even amidst public protestations of any intention to weaponize, the scientists were instructed to build nuclear weapons. Can such a gap between publicly avowed policy and actual practice be justified in a parliamentary democracy ? Should we then allow for the possibility that even now the Government has some scientists working on biological or chemical weapons ? It is a severe criticism on our political, bureaucratic and scientific leadership that they seem to treat this matter lightly.

In a different vein, there is despondence among peace activists. Can we do anything at all to stop this process of weaponization, to ``get off this tiger'' that we have perched on ? Vocal opposition is in such a minority, and few senior scientists publicly criticize governmental policy of any kind. How can an anti-nuke movement succeed in India in such a situation ?

Today's convention is an attempt to address some of these questions, at least in a limited way. Presentations today will look at not only the technical issues related to nuclear weapons, but also the socio-economic costs and S&T policy implications of weaponization. We will see whether `credible deterrence' is a realistic option for India and examine the nuclear policy options available in the global scenario today. We will study the rôle played by the global disarmament movement towards reduction of nuclear weapons and draw lessons for our own campaigns.

It is a clichè to remark that ``we merely raise questions, we do not claim to have answers for all of them''. As it turns out, this is a much-travelled road; many other societies, other movements, have been at a similar juncture in recent history, and raised very similar questions, and a number of answers have emerged. Perhaps they may not apply to our situation precisely so; nevertheless, we can learn from their experiences. If we do not, we will only see more and more subversions of Indian democracy from the path of genuine development.

Having begun with a quote from the Pugwash declaration, it is quite appropriate to end these introductory remarks with another, from a convention during the 25th anniversary of Pugwash:

We now appeal: To our colleagues of the world's scientific community: accept responsibility and become directly involved in actions to avert nuclear war. To governments of the world: seek a comprehensive international agreement for eliminating the risk of nuclear war, and the danger to civilization involved in any use of nuclear weapons. To all peoples: support measures to remove the nuclear menace that threatens the survival of mankind.

4. Letters to ISANW

Edited by: Radhika, Tabish

Indian Scientists Against Nuclear Weapons
isanw@arbornet.org.
http://www.isanw.org/