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Article 2 |
Most of us are not directly involved in the act of weaponisation - nuclear or otherwise, but we have an opinion about the nation's nuclear policies and more particularly about the recent nuclear tests. Very disturbingly, for many of us, this opinion is q uite positive, occasionally veering towards a vulgar and alarming tone of jingoism (though the initial euphoria amongst some of us has died down over time). However distressed, one cannot dismiss this hard reality as mere trivia, since it involves a large number of people around us whose views, or more appropriately, blissful indifference, inaction and passivism do create a congenial yet inert public opinion - an ideal atmosphere within which elite-dominated, citizen-irreverent public policies are spawned .
While one may retain a basic faith in the old maxim that `all the people cannot be fooled all the time', one cannot but acknowledge the dangerous possibility that a sizable number of people can be effectively persuaded within quite a short period of time to suspend their refined common sense and judgments about things that really matter in their day-to-day living and to believe instead in the illusion that the so-called military security will enhance human security; that flexing of our nuclear muscles wi ll literally energize the muscles of our teeming millions who are poor, famished and malnourished and help them cope with the perpetual vulnerabilities which `adorn' their daily existence.
This is the delusion many of us have descended into in recent times. How has it got to be this way in a country with a legacy of passive resistance, non-alignment movements and democratic socialism? Postponing the examination of this momentous issue for now, here I only underline the supreme need to acknowledge the reality of such a mass-mesmerization; as a fellow citizen I find it important to comprehend this not-so-insignificant support for pro-nuclear policies. Such act of comprehension and serious re cognition of the ground reality alone can enable us to launch a strategy of counter-persuasion. That is to say, the plentiful nuclear-philists amidst us compel a nuclear-phobist like me to take them seriously yet try to convince them to think otherwise, t o help them break out of their `pro-nuclear brainwashing'.
More concretely, I base my appeal to the unconverted audience on three arguments and take them in turn : 1) Weaponisation - especially nuclear - is the wrongest route to ensuring human security; 2) In uncritically endorsing the `logic' behind nuclear tes ts then and the nuclear doctrine now, we are playing the role of powerless subjects in the euphemistic guise of citizenship; 3) Unlike many crises that are `more or less' in nature, damages that can be potentially caused by nuclear conflicts are of the ki nd of `either or'; they contain the germs of total annihilation, leading to points of no return.
Is there any military answer to social and economic malaise that plague large parts of the country? Does the bomb guarantee our security when it is understood in the sense of providing a safety net for all? A pragmatic look at the fragile existence of th e mass of the Indian population would suggest the exact opposite. Excessive preoccupation with military security in fact undermines human security; that is to say, it appallingly detracts our attention from issues related to development, environment and h uman rights. When the daily existence of a large number of people in the country is subject to calamitous conditions caused by economic, social and political constraints, to speak of bomb-bred security indeed seems to be a bombastic claim! What is more, t he risks and costs of weaponisation are bound to be socialized, though in a very regressive way. In other words, an oversized military budget (a likely fallout of the ongoing trend of armament) and an attendant decline in social sector spending are bound to create new social and economic risks and vulnerabilities for precisely those people - for example, workers, agricultural labourers, slum-dwellers, in short, the mass of the people - who have had nothing to do with the decision to go nuclear. They are t he ones who will end up bearing disproportionately the costs and grievously suffering from the effects (such as social expenditure cuts, sanctions and so on) of acquiring the `exotic nuclear endowment'.
It is indeed ironical that in the current national and international climate of cost-consciousness we often hear a clamour for rolling back or even dismantling the state in various sectors of activities; yet the same state is expected to be hyperactive i n the task of expanding nuclear and other weapons! Let the state take the lead in proliferating the `public bad' of huge military arsenals, its absolute inertia and sloth in providing fundamental `public goods' to citizens notwithstanding! The military bu dget indeed appears to be a sacred cow, supplying much-needed subsidies to the military-industrial complex, while vociferous advocates of fiscal adjustment selectively train their guns at soft targets like education or health care spending. The message is clear and simple : austerity in public spending and `free market' are for the poor whereas the welfare state is for the rich who will take shelter under the wings of generous defence expenditure.
Have the weaponisation proponents amongst us noticed this role reversal of the state, while celebrating the nation's newly acquired nuclear prowess or endorsing the recently published nuclear doctrine which appears to `call for a robust nuclear force'? Unfortunately not and the reason for this is not far to seek. Recall that the decision to conduct nuclear tests was taken in the most undemocratic fashion under tight security and control without even the full cabinet knowledge, let alone public discussion s. We, the people - entrusted with sovereign power according to the preamble of our Constitution - have not been expected to participate in the decision making process on a matter as serious as this; we have been relieved of the responsibility of citizens hip; spared the trouble of debating and deciding about the developmental priorities of our poor nation and the desired budgetary allocations across sectors; have been told and accepted in turn that power is defined as domination and war capability and not as empowerment and human capability.
Simply put, we have embraced the model of citizens as subjects, who remain at the margin of agenda-setting and decision-making, yet are happy, docile and proud of the national military prowess. We are strongly discouraged, penalized, or disregarded when we try to assert our rights of citizenship; the ongoing political and electoral drama of coalition-breaking and coalition-making at the centre to the utter disregard for popular mandates is a case in point. Yet we are encouraged to ungrudgingly consume, not to question or debate, the official `logic' of empowerment through armament. This consumer orientation to citizenship is a step towards the marginalization of people, towards denying them some influence over their affairs as citizens. To quote Noam Chomsky's observation made in a different but related context, "The Public are to be observers, not participants, to be consumers of ideology as well as products." We are the uninformed, subject `citizenry' - the riffraff - flaunting an unexamined faith in the special interests and ambitions of the political, scientific and bureaucratic elite, cleverly camouflaged as the national interest. So much for our well thought-out and informed endorsement of nuclear and arms proliferation!
One may argue that on an issue as `vital and serious' as national security, decisions should be left to `experts' alone and kept away from the public. But in a deliberative democracy voters are expected to participate and deliberate on serious issues and not simply vote; norms such as participation and accountability are indeed the bedrock of democracy. So the examination of pros and cons of `security' issues may be conducted by experts, but they are then required to present their views and results for c itizens and elected leaders to consider in the context of country's overall social, economic and political objectives.
To be sure, people do not speak in a single voice; neither can we assert that deliberation is always the only or the best way to arrive at a political decision. But it is precisely because the weaponisation issue at hand has wide-ranging ramifications fo r the public that citizens should have the opportunity for debating the question on its merits; their accountable representatives should justify their views and decisions by giving `persuadable' reasons; such collective engagement with the underlying reas onings of divergent views is a vital source of the legitimacy of collective decisions. In the case of the `nuclear' question, it is precisely the denial of such a scope for public debate and dialogue that has rendered the country's citizens into subjects, into consumers rather than producers of ideas.
Admittedly, the recently published nuclear doctrine prepared by the National Security Advisory Board is a draft document aimed at generating wider public discussions. In principle, therefore, there is some scope for citizens to deliberate on the country' s future nuclear, policy, practice and posture. But keeping in mind how rhetoric translates into reality, two important issues merit attention here. First, if earlier there were `security' reasons that compelled the concerned authorities to be `secretive' about the nuclear tests, now there are political and `electoral' reasons to make the document public, that is to say, to tap into our `Kargil euphoria' for the vindication of a pro-nuclear posture.
Second, moving beyond the logic of the timing of publication and coming to the specifics of the doctrine, it is being said that the document, with its focus on `effective credible minimum deterrence' on the one hand and reiteration of the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons on the other, at once `administers a necessary dose of reality' into our nuclear dialogues as well as seeks moderation in the country's nuclear policy. Notice that such presumed nuclear restraint is based upon the logic of `assured retaliation', that is to say, on the assumption that the capacity to inflict `unacceptable damage' to a potential adversary through nuclear weapons will actually prevent their use via the path of `credible threats'. Many compelling arguments have been put forth against the alleged merits of the `deterrence' argument which we need not belabour here.
Instead, we focus on the question of `unacceptable damage' and responsible policy behaviour. Does unacceptable human misery indeed evoke responsible and adequate policy responses in a society with a large `democratic deficit'? Aren't quiet catastrophes s uch as poverty, hunger, malnutrition and illiteracy instances of intolerable social malaise in our country? But we have tolerated such abject human conditions for full fifty years of our independent existence, despite pious policy rhetorics to do otherwis e. More distressingly, no corrupt practices on the part of the elite, no pilferage of public funds, no flagrant violations of public duties (e.g., the Gaisal rail accident) have been `deterred' on account of their unacceptably deleterious consequences for the well-being of the poor and the disfavoured.
When persistent damages to the lives of `sovereign' people have been routinely and infinitely tolerated by the governing classes of our country as well as those of our neighbouring nuclear `adversary', is it reasonable to expect that jingoistic nuclear b ehaviour of vested interests on either side of the LOC will be deterred by human costs it entails? Do we, the people, matter in the calculus of `unacceptable damage'? Our heritage of deprivation, our social policy failures and our citizenship records do n ot quite tell us so.
Recent debates on the notion of unacceptable damage concentrate mainly on strategic and geo-political considerations, to the relative neglect of `illfare' which continues to threaten, through times of war and peace, the lives of large segments of the peo ple. In the face of such chronic insensitivity on the part of the political leadership to human security issues, we need to be wary as to whether we, the people, and our day-to-day vulnerabilities will be factored in to the damage assessment of the powers that be.
Reclaiming our sovereignty as the people of a democratic nation is, however, not an impossible task. Indeed, when policy making is embedded in consultative and transparent processes, democracy offers a way of rescuing governments that have fallen under t he sway of vested interests. As Churchill once said, `Democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others.' The real challenge, therefore, is to encourage the initiatives of the citizens; to harness the power of public opinion and action s uch that governments become responsive and accountable to the will of the majority and make real difference to the quality of people's lives.
Fortunately, informed public debates have been taking place during the last year in different corners of the country, critically reviewing the `merits' of the decision to go nuclear. Out of the nuanced and well-documented evidence that are being presente d in these discourses, what comes out in resounding notes is the unmistakable and plain understanding that we have only one earth to save and live in. The destructive capacity of a nuclear conflict is so catastrophic, complete and final that it cannot be measured on a scale of `more or less'; it is a judgment call of `either or'; `preserve or perish'; there are no two ways about it. To take liberty with Gandhi, an eye for an eye - the so-called mutual assured destruction - will indeed make the whole world blind and a `radiated ruin'. It is, therefore, futile to endorse a position of the limited use of low-yield nuclear weapons. There is no alternative to developing an absolute nuclear phobia; to admitting that it is an utter prejudice to take pride in nuclear possessions, low-yield or high-yield. Why is this prejudice still so prominent in our minds? I take a shorthand to address this profound issue by quoting economist Paul Krugman, `Bad ideas flourish because they are in the interest of powerful groups. ' We, the people, need to see through this trickery. The rest is much easier.
We would like to conclude this note on a self-policing tone; that is to say, while making a strong case for nuclear disarmament and abolition, we are willing to concede that many concerns vis-a-vis the de-weaponisation path still endure. More concretely, the cautionary views and nagging doubts about the viability of the de-weaponisation path, that are now being expressed in some quarters in the light of the recent NATO bombings in Yugoslavia, cannot be left unaddressed; to do so would be unconvincing to those with whom we disagree on the issue of weaponisation. A `realist', for example, would argue that in a uni-polar world with an overly militarized `rogue superpower', it is a compulsion to arm and even go nuclear in order to protect people's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
A proponent of disarmament and peace will have to address this issue squarely; correlatively she has to relentlessly search for an alternative to armament which at once engenders peace and protects sovereignty and the right to self-determination of the people in the third world against the military aggrandizement of the `nuclear-rich' countries. This is not an easy task; but neither is it impenetrable, we hope.
Saner voices for global peace will have to converge to raise a clamour for the wholesale disarmament and abolition of nuclear weapons - both locally and globally, both in developed and developing countries. The challenge before a nuclear-phobist is, ther efore, to suggest a feasible way of resolving the alleged tension between ensuring global peace on the one hand and local freedom on the other in a highly militarized geo-political situation. There is surely no magical solution; but the alleged trade-off, we claim, is not so tight either.
One may also point out that in this age of MNC-dominated globalization, countries, especially the poorer ones, are vulnerable not just to military threats but more frequently to economic insecurities and predicaments. These political-economy arguments, h ighlighting the iniquitous nature of the world economic order, have to be factored in for a even-handed treatment of the question of global peace. To be sure, these concerns are not new; they have indeed continued to hold a grip on the imagination of nati on-states since the Second World War. But one thing has become transparent to peace proponents over time, i.e., the `solution' to these entrenched problems has to be sought in `political' and not in `military' terms; a `rule of International Law' administ ered by a supra-national global government is the only viable tool for both ensuring peace on the earth as well as taming the extant military and economic hegemons. To that end, debates, discussions and public action have to be on in order to find out, for example, how we can embolden the currently atrophied United Nations organizations, how we can revive the moribund non-alignment movement and how we can educate people worldwide about the misleading nature of the `deterrence' argument. Hence the appeal for a fuller play of all the standard democratic practices - debates, deliberations, organizations and protests - for a saner collective wisdom to emerge.