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FACTS ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS |
NPT introduced the definition of nuclear weapons states: those which had tested a nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967. The key principle of NPT is that possession of nuclear weapons be limited to only these states. This was sought to be enforced by ensuring that these nuclear `haves' do not transfer nuclear weapons capabilities to nuclear `have-nots'.
Discussions on NPT centred around the fact that while non-proliferation was sought to be enforced, the weapons states were in no way being constrained from producing more weapons. Eventually, under pressure from non-nuclear states and disarmament groups, a clause was added (Article VI) which urged the weapons states to pursue negotiations ``in good faith'' towards nuclear disarmament.
As formulated, NPT is blatantly discriminatory and legitimises the weapons of the five nuclear weapons states. India has refused to be a party to it because of this discriminatory nature and has not signed NPT so far.
The main purpose of CTBT is to put an end to nuclear explosions which seek to test weapons technology. Signatories to the treaty cannot conduct any nuclear explosions.
Two key features of CTBT stand out. One is that the treaty bans only explosions, allowing sub-critical (non-explosive) weapons tests as well as detailed computer simulations which make explosions unnecessary. (Weapons states like the U.S. do possess such capabilities.) The second feature is that the treaty comes into force only if and when all countries having nuclear capabilities sign the treaty. In particular, this has meant that unless India and Pakistan sign CTBT, the treaty will not come into force at all (leading to international pressure on India and Pakistan).
Since CTBT does not distinguish between weapons states and others, it is not explicitly discriminatory. However, India has argued that CTBT is merely a corollary of NPT and that it perpetuates a discriminatory order: the weapons states will only stop a form of testing which perhaps they do not need anyway, without committing them to any time-bound programme of disarmament. In 1996, India refused to sign CTBT on these grounds, while at the same time committing to the self-restraint of not producing weapons. This Indian stand was widely seen as a moral one, and acclaimed.
However, after the Pokhran explosions, the earlier restraint has been abandoned, and now there is again international pressure on India to sign the CTBT.
For the nuclear weapons states, the CTBT would restrict the ability to design new types of weapons though it will not completely eliminate it. It will be possible to modify existing designs but a completely new design will be very difficult to implement reliably in absence of explosive nuclear tests.
It is possible to make reliable nuclear weapons of a simple design without explosive nuclear tests. Thus the CTBT will not be able to prevent non-nuclear states from doing so. However more sophisticated designs (which would be more efficient) require testing to make sure that they are safe and reliable.
A nuclear explosion by a country can be detected by other countries, whereas a country's production of fissile material can be checked by another only by physically entering the former's installations. So a crucial feature of FMCT is the verification regime accompanying it which will bring in ``full scope safeguards''. Such observation of indigenous atomic energy programmes is likely to be unacceptably intrusive.
A similarity between CTBT and FMCT may be in that again weapons states may agree for the simple reason that they will not be affected. Most of the weapons states are suspected to have high stock piles of fissile materials and hence may not require further production of such material. Thus again, the constraint would only be on non-weapons states. Further, the FMCT will not restrict the production of pure fusion weapons (Section 2), if it becomes feasible.
India has not been party to FMCT negotiations so far.
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